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Religious Attendance in Cross-National






Why are some nations more religious than others? This article pro-
poses a multilevel framework in which country differences in reli-
gious attendance are explained by contextual, individual, and cross-
level interaction effects. Hypotheses from different theories are
simultaneously tested with data from 60 nations obtained from the
European/World Values Surveys. Multilevel logistic regression anal-
yses show that religious regulation in a country diminishes religious
attendance and that there are only small negative effects of people’s
own education and average educational level of the country. Reli-
gious attendance is strongly affected by personal and societal in-
securities and by parental and national religious socialization and
level of urbanization. These theories explain 75% of the cross-
national variation in religious attendance.
INTRODUCTION
Why do people in some nations attend religious meetings more frequently
than people in other nations? One classical answer to this question, known
as secularization theory, has fallen on hard times. In two reviews of the
1 The order of the authors is alphabetical. The authors’ contributions are equal. We
would like to thank Jos Dessens, Nan Dirk De Graaf, Wim Jansen, Ineke Maas, Ariana
Need, Wout Ultee, and the AJS reviewers for their helpful suggestions and comments
on an earlier draft of this article. An earlier version of this article was presented at
the Dag van de Sociologie, Rotterdam, Netherlands, May 31, 2007, and at the European
Survey Research Association 2007 Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, June 25–29,
2007. Direct correspondence to Frank van Tubergen, Department of Sociology/ICS,
Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 2, 3584 CS Utrecht, Netherlands. E-mail:
f.vantubergen@uu.nl
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secularization thesis, the sociologist Rodney Stark (1999) and the econo-
mist Laurence Iannaccone (1998) summarized the ample empirical and
theoretical problems to the idea that was once forcefully proposed in the
work of Weber ([1922] 1993) and Berger (1967). Reflecting on hypotheses
advanced by secularization theory, Iannaccone (1998, p. 1468) remarks
that “most people ‘know’ these statements to be true, even though decades
of research have repeatedly proved them false.” Stark (1999, p. 269) con-
cludes his article by saying that “once and for all, let us declare an end
to social scientific faith in the theory of secularization, recognizing that
it was the product of wishful thinking.”
According to secularization theory, the religiosity of people is an out-
come of the modernity of their country. It is said that in modern countries,
people have less religious commitment and attend religious meetings less
frequently than in more traditional countries. The bulk of evidence against
the presumed modernization-secularization link listed by Stark and Ian-
naccone comes from two sources. First, it has been shown that in one of
the most modern nations in the world, the United States, religious atten-
dance is much higher than in less modern nations. Second, despite the
modernization process in Europe, there would be “no demonstrable long-
term decline in European religious participation” (Stark 1999, p. 254).
As a consequence of the empirical difficulties with secularization theory,
an important alternative theory has been developed to understand the
cross-national variation in religious attendance. According to the religious
market theory, people attend religious meetings more frequently in coun-
tries with strong religious competition and less religious regulation, be-
cause in these countries “religious suppliers” produce more attractive re-
ligious products (Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Finke and Stark 1988;
Iannaccone 1990, 1991, 1995; Stark and Finke 2000). Many studies have
tested the importance of the attractiveness of religious products by looking
at the Herfindahl index of religious concentration (e.g., Iannaccone 1991;
Chaves and Cann 1992; Verweij, Ester, and Nauta 1997; Smith, Sawkins,
and Seaman 1998; North and Gwin 2004; Halman and Draulans 2006;
McCleary and Barro 2006), which is computed as the sum of squares of
the proportions of each denomination within a particular unit (e.g., coun-
try, region).
Although the religious market theory has been labeled “the new par-
adigm” (Warner 1993), it has also been criticized. Contrary to expectations,
there is no negative relationship between religious concentration and re-
ligious attendance in predominantly Catholic countries (Chaves and Cann
1992). Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002) demonstrated that the Herfindahl
index mathematically results in a nonzero correlation between religious
concentration and religious attendance, even if there exists no substantive
relation. Voas et al. concluded that “there is no compelling evidence that
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religious pluralism has any effect on religious participation” (2002, p. 212).
Likewise, after reviewing the ample empirical studies on the role of re-
ligious pluralism, Chaves and Gorski (2001, p. 274) concluded that “the
claim that religious pluralism and religious participation are generally
and positively associated with one another is not supported.”
As both the secularization theory and the religious market theory have
been confronted with empirical difficulties, how should we evaluate them?
And, given these empirical limitations, how can we understand the cross-
national variation in religious attendance? As we see it, several theoretical
and methodological problems have hindered a sound assessment of both
theories and, as a consequence, have hindered our understanding of cross-
national differences in religious attendance. We highlight five problems,
and we try to overcome them in this article.
First, rather than one single theory, there are different theories sub-
sumed under “the secularization theory” and “the religious market theory,”
so evidence against one theory need not falsify the more general research
paradigm. Although the religious concentration theory has been con-
fronted with empirical problems, another theory subsumed under the
religious market paradigm can be fruitfully incorporated in cross-national
analysis. Thus, the religious regulation theory expects that cross-national
variation in the degree of religious regulation by the state explains
between-country differences in religious attendance (Finke 1990; Chaves
and Cann 1992; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Iannaccone 1995; Stark and
Finke 2000), and we test this idea in our study. Furthermore, although
the secularization paradigm assumes that modernization (often opera-
tionalized as gross domestic product [GDP] per capita) leads to less re-
ligious commitment, (at least) three different mechanisms can be identified
in the literature. Probably the oldest theory argues that modernization
leads to less religious commitment because of the growth of education,
science, and a technological worldview. According to this theory, mod-
ernization of ideologies is the mechanism through which the more tra-
ditional religious worldview erodes (Weber [1922] 1993). Another secu-
larization theory focuses instead on the modernization of social ties, that
is, the diminishing strength and multiplexity of social ties and the de-
creasing density and homogeneity of social networks. This, in turn, leads
to less control of religious communities over their members, resulting in
less religious commitment (Durkheim 1912; Kelley and De Graaf 1997).
More recently, yet another version of the secularization paradigm has
been proposed. According to this theory, cross-national differences in re-
ligion can be explained by the modernization of economies (Inglehart and
Baker 2000; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Modernization generally leads
to more financial, social, and political securities for the population, re-
ducing the need for religious reassurance. Hence, instead of confronting
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two paradigms in an abstract way, this article empirically examines how
well four theories explain cross-national variation in religious attendance.
Second, a substantial number of studies have examined aggregate-level
outcomes of religiosity. In these analyses, individual measures of religion
are aggregated to the national level (Iannaccone 1991; Chaves and Cann
1992; Smith et al. 1998; Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004; Norris and Inglehart
2004; North and Gwin 2004; McCleary and Barro 2006). An important
drawback of this macro-oriented research is that inferences about micro-
level processes are based on aggregate statistics, possibly leading to “eco-
logical fallacies” (Robinson 1950). Furthermore, these macro-oriented
studies do not inform us about the importance of the macrolevel vis-a`-
vis the microlevel. How important are nations in shaping the religiosity
of people? How strongly do people within a single nation differ in their
religious attendance? In this study, we study individual religious atten-
dance and reformulate theories in such a way that they fit a multilevel
framework that considers contextual, individual, and cross-level inter-
action effects (Coleman 1990).
Third, the differential role of societal conditions during childhood and
at the time of the survey has been understudied in empirical research.
For instance, Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that religious commitment
is stronger among those who grew up in less secure conditions. In their
empirical analysis, however, they examine the degree of insecurity at the
moment of the survey and show that it has the predicted positive effect
on religious attendance. Similarly, Kelley and De Graaf (1997) use present
measures of national religiosity to capture the role of religious socializa-
tion. In these and other studies, there is a mismatch between the hy-
pothesized role of macrolevel conditions at youth and the influence of
macrolevel conditions later in life that are examined empirically. In our
study, we test the rival theories with information on present and past
societal conditions.
Fourth, previous studies have mostly considered one or only a few
characteristics of nations, not taking into account alternative theories at
the same time. For instance, Chaves and Cann (1992) presented macro-
level evidence in favor of the religious regulation theory but did not
include macrolevel variables informed by rival “secularization” theories.
Similarly, Norris and Inglehart (2004) concluded that the theory of eco-
nomic modernization was confirmed in their analysis, but they omitted
macrolevel effects informed by “religious market” theories. We study four
rival theories simultaneously, yielding a more rigorous empirical test of
each.
Finally, most previous cross-national studies of religiosity have relied
on a few nations to test their macrolevel hypotheses. The 1981 wave of
the European/World Values Surveys, which included 18 countries, was
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used by Iannaccone (1991) and Chaves and Cann (1992). Others, such as
Kelley and De Graaf (1997) and Smith et al. (1998), used the 1991 wave
of the International Social Survey Program, which was conducted in 18
nations. Testing (rival) hypotheses with a few cases can lead to erroneous
conclusions. We expand the comparative scope of the analysis by ex-
amining 60 nations. Data are from three waves of the European/World
Values Surveys, conducted in the period between 1990 and 2001.
THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES
In order to understand the cross-national variation in religious attendance,
researchers have proposed a number of theoretically informed macrolevel
variables. Because researchers have often examined aggregate-level out-
comes of religion, the relationship mostly studied is that between certain
macrolevel predictors and macrolevel measures of religion. In figure 1
this relationship is depicted as arrow A. For instance, researchers have
argued that a nation’s religious attendance is an outcome of the country’s
level of religious regulation (Chaves and Cann 1992) or socioeconomic
inequality (Norris and Inglehart 2004).
However, relationships observed at the macrolevel (i.e., fig. 1, arrow
A) can be the result of different processes. Adopting a multilevel frame-
work, we argue that macrolevel effects on religious attendance can arise
in three different ways. First, macrolevel effects can be compositional in
nature. In that scenario, macro differences arise because of the unequal
distribution of individual characteristics (relation B), which in turn influ-
ence religious attendance (C). Second, nations can also have a contextual
effect on religious attendance. If that is the case, properties of nations
have a direct effect on attendance (E) over and above individual char-
acteristics. Third, cross-national differences can be the result of cross-level
interaction effects. If so, certain characteristics of countries condition the
relationship between important individual characteristics and religious
attendance (F). In all cases, the influence on individual attendance leads
to aggregate outcomes in national attendance (D). In the following dis-
cussion we use this framework to derive our hypotheses.
Religious Regulation
The first theory that could explain cross-national variation in religious
attendance focuses on the role of the state in the regulation of religion
(Finke 1990; Chaves and Cann 1992; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Ian-
naccone 1995; Stark and Finke 2000). Regulation of religion includes, for
instance, legal relationships between state and religion, governmental de-
American Journal of Sociology
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Fig. 1.—Relationship between macro characteristics and religious attendance
partments for handling religious affairs, and state ownership of religious
property. Whereas several religious economies are regulated and monop-
olized by the state, other religious economies are more open. According
to the religious regulation theory, religious consumption is expected to be
higher in a free, unregulated market than in a market controlled by the
state. Lipset (1990) advanced this idea to explain the high religiosity in
the United States, which has a long legacy of constitutional division be-
tween state and religion. Similarly, Chaves and Cann (1992) argued that
this idea should explain the strong variation in religious attendance across
predominantly Catholic countries. For instance, religious attendance is
higher in Ireland, where religion and the state are more disconnected,
than in Belgium (Chaves and Cann 1992). Hence,
Hypothesis 1.—We expect that the more religious regulation in a coun-
try, the lower the religious attendance in that country.
Note that this is a true contextual effect (i.e., fig. 1, arrow E).
Modernization of Ideologies: Scientific Worldview
The second theory argues that cross-national variation in religious atten-
dance is related to science and education. With higher levels of technology,
education, and more activist ideologies, principles such as a spirit of free
inquiry or freedom of thought are stimulated and an active, mechanistic
worldview would become more dominant. Because the scientific ratio-
nalism undermines the cognitive basis of religious worldviews, modernity
would lead to lower levels of religious commitment (Weber [1922] 1993;
Need and De Graaf 1996; Stark, Iannaccone, and Finke 1996).
The modernization of ideologies thesis assumes that at schools people
are taught a mechanistic worldview and trained in critical thinking, and
this mechanistic, critical worldview is difficult to wed with the traditional,
religious worldview. In this way, the theory argues that the modernization-
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religion link occurs because of the positive association between modern-
ization and education and the negative effect of education on religious
attendance. This suggests that cross-national differences in religious at-
tendance are partly due to compositional effects:
Hypothesis 2.—The more highly educated people are, the less often
they attend religious meetings.
In addition, the cross-national variation in educational expansion
should then partly explain cross-national differences in religious atten-
dance (i.e., arrows B and C, fig. 1). One would expect, however, that over
and above people’s own education, the level of education in the country
affects people’s own religious attendance as well. In highly educated
nations, it is assumed that people are exposed outside the school setting
to a more rational worldview than in less educated nations. Hence,
Hypothesis 3.—People who live in countries with a higher level of
education attend religious meetings less frequently.
Modernization of Economies: Security
In their contribution to the secularization debate, Norris and Inglehart
(2004) stress that the presumed modernization-secularization link should
not be interpreted in terms of increasing rationalized worldviews. They
argue that modernization lowers people’s religious belief and attendance
primarily because it reduces the financial, political, and material inse-
curities that people face. According to Norris and Inglehart, “the need
for religious reassurance becomes less pressing under conditions of greater
security. These effects operate at both the societal level (socio-tropic) and
the personal level (ego-tropic). Greater protection and control, longevity,
and health found in postindustrial nations mean that fewer people in
these societies regard traditional spiritual values, beliefs, and practices as
vital to their lives, or to the lives of their community” (p. 18). Norris and
Inglehart furthermore anticipate that “the declining importance of reli-
gious values in postindustrial nations in turn eroded regular attendance
in religious practices, exemplified by attendance at services of worship
and engagement in regular prayer or meditation” (p. 19).
According to this theory, the modernity-secularization link should be
interpreted in terms of (increasing) existential securities. Modern nations
are wealthier than traditional nations, and people in these more affluent
nations face fewer economic risks and other kinds of insecurities. If there
is indeed a linkage between national insecurity and individual religion,
this means that cross-national differences in religious attendance should
again be partly compositional in nature. Here, we focus on economic
insecurities. Thus,
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Hypothesis 4.—People with a less secure (economic) position (e.g.,
unemployed, low income) attend religious meetings more often.
We expect that taking people’s individual (economic) situation into
account partly explains cross-national differences in religious attendance.
Norris and Inglehart (2004) also expect that contextual conditions affect
religious attendance. Although they argue that all kinds of insecurities in
a country increase religious attendance, they pay special attention to so-
cioeconomic inequalities. In countries with larger income inequalities, the
poor have more financial insecurities than in countries with fewer in-
equalities. However, economic mobility and people’s expectations of their
own future would also lead the rich to experience more financial inse-
curities in countries with large income disparities.
On the basis of people’s current conditions and their expectations of
the future, one would expect the following:
Hypothesis 5.—In countries with more socioeconomic inequalities,
people attend religious meetings more frequently.
In addition to the impact of present insecurities (and people’s expec-
tations of the future), Norris and Inglehart (2004, p. 18) argue that ex-
periences during childhood have an enduring impact on people’s religious
attendance. They write that “the experiences of growing up in less secure
societies will heighten the importance of religious values.” In particular,
they identify the possibly enduring role of war and argue that people who
grew up during a war in their country will remain more religious through-
out their life (p. 16). Therefore,
Hypothesis 6.—People who grew up in times of war attend religious
meetings more frequently later in life.
Modernization of Social Ties: Individualization
The fourth theory examined in this article focuses on the modernization
of social relationships. Its basic assumption is that religious behavior is
a predominantly social phenomenon, in which people are socialized, con-
trolled, and possibly sanctioned by their parents, family, neighbors, reli-
gious community, schoolteachers, and other socializing agents. People who
are raised in a religious environment more strongly internalize religious
norms and more strongly comply with them later in life (Durkheim 1912;
Berger 1967; van Tubergen, te Grotenhuis, and Ultee 2005). According
to this theory, modernization leads to secularization because of individ-
ualization, that is, diminishing strength and multiplexity of social ties and
decreasing social control.
We examine this theory first by looking at urbanization. Social ties in
more rural settings are more intense, multiplex, and kin-based, and net-
works in rural areas are more dense and homogeneous (e.g., Curtis White
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and Guest 2003), conditions that lead to more normative pressures toward
conformity (Marsden 1987). Thus, in more rural areas, social ties between
people are stronger, leading to a stronger role of the family and the com-
munity to socialize people religiously and to control their religious be-
havior later in life. Thus,
Hypothesis 7.—People who live in more urban regions attend religious
meetings less often.
One would also expect that over and above the impact of the urban-
ization of the direct environment in which people live, the level of ur-
banization of the country plays a role. The reason is that personal social
networks are not restricted to the direct living environment (Beggs,
Haines, and Hurlbert 1996). In more rural countries, people have more
kin-based, intense, and multiplex social relations than in more urban
countries (Ho¨llinger and Haller 1990). The relationships people have out-
side their direct region of living can affect people’s religious beliefs and
practices. We argue that these social ties are less strong in more urban
countries, leading to fewer normative pressures toward religious behavior.
Hypothesis 8.—People who live in more urban nations attend religious
meetings less often.
Cross-national variation in religious socialization is another important
ingredient of country differences in religious attendance. The religious
environment in which people grow up is unequally distributed in the
world. These contexts during childhood are unchosen and therefore con-
stitute an independent determinant of religious attendance (Kelley and
De Graaf 1997). Previous research has suggested and indeed found that
parental religiosity plays an enduring role in people’s own religious be-
havior (Myers 1996; Need and De Graaf 1996). Thus,
Hypothesis 9.—The stronger the religiosity of the parents, the more
likely the offspring are to attend religious meetings later in life.
Over and above the presumed impact of parental religiosity, the national
religious context during childhood could be important as well. At school,
people are confronted with the norms of the teachers and affected by the
religiosity of their peers. When people cohabit, they are influenced by the
opinions of their partner (te Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001), and at work
people are exposed to the norms of their colleagues. Hence, people who
are socialized in a relatively religious nation will have more religious
parents; likewise, their neighbors, teachers, friends, partner, and col-
leagues will be more religious than in more secular nations. This suggests
that the religiosity of the nation in which people were born affects their
religious socialization and exposure to religious norms throughout their
life.
Hypothesis 10.—The stronger the religiosity of the nation during a
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person’s childhood, the more frequently that person will attend religious
meetings later in life .
Possibly there is a cross-level interaction between the religiosity of the
nation during childhood and parental religiosity. Kelley and De Graaf
(1997) suggested that religious parents become more active in a rather
secular environment. According to them, religious parents who live in a
rather secular society try to control the religious context of their offspring
by “screening potential friends, teachers, and marriage partners; by en-
rolling their children in church groups or sending them to religious schools
to ensure an appropriate pool of potential friends and marriage partners;
by socializing their children to reject the irreligious; and in many other
ways” (p. 641). Conversely, devout parents in a religious nation do not
need to protect their children from the secular beliefs and practices, and
they therefore spend less time and effort in controlling their children’s
religious environment. In view of these ideas,
Hypothesis 11.—The stronger the religiosity of the nation during a




We use data from the 1990–93, 1995–97, and 1999–2001 waves of the
European Values Surveys/World Values Surveys (EVS/WVS) (EVSG and
WVSA 2005; WVSG 1999). Together, these three waves of the EVS/WVS
contain nationally representative surveys from 82 countries, including rich
and poor nations, Christian and non-Christian, religious and secular. Un-
fortunately, for 22 countries (particularly the poorer, non-Christian
nations), information on one or more individual-level or contextual-level
variables is missing, and we therefore had to remove these countries from
our analysis.2 For those countries for which we had some missing infor-
mation on individual-level variables (i.e., for some respondents, though
not all), we use the multiple imputation procedure from SAS 9 to obtain
five imputed data sets. After the estimation of our models on these five
separate data sets, we apply Rubin’s (1987) rules to get the right parameter
estimates. We select respondents above 18 years of age and include both
2 Because of these missing variables, the following countries were left out of our anal-
yses: Albania, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, South Korea,
Montenegro, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Serbia, Singapore, South
Africa, Taiwan, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
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men and women. All in all, our analyses include 136,611 respondents
( ) from 60 countries ( ).N N1 2
Dependent Variable
Religious attendance.—In all three waves of EVS/WVS, respondents were
asked in the same way about their religious attendance: “Apart from
weddings, funerals, and christenings, how often do you attend religious
services?” Responses ranged on a seven-point scale from “never” to “more
than once a week.” Because some of the contrasts in the original ordinal
variable (especially at the lower end) do not clearly differentiate between
more and less religious people, we decided to analyze a clear contrast.3
In our analyses we distinguish respondents who attend religious services
at least weekly (one) from those who go to church less frequently (zero).
This contrast nicely aligns with prescribed frequency of attendance (i.e.,
at least weekly) in most of the dominant religions in our data set. Averaged
over all countries, 24% of the respondents said they attended religious
services on a weekly basis.
Independent Variables
Religious regulation.—We measure religious regulation with the Religious
Regulation Index, which was constructed by Norris and Inglehart (2004).4
This index is an expanded version of the measure developed by Chaves
and Cann (1992) of state regulation of religion in 18 Western countries.
The Norris and Inglehart index was classified according to 20 criteria of
freedom of religion. Norris and Inglehart coded each criterion zero/one,
and the total scale was standardized to 10 points, ranging from low to
high religious regulation. A potential drawback of this scale is that it
includes items measuring “government regulation of religion” (i.e., the
restrictions placed on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by
the official laws, policies, or administrative actions of the state) and other
items reflecting “government favoritism of religion” (i.e., the actions of
the state that provide one religion or a small group of religions special
privileges, support, or favorable sanctions). The hypothesis tested in this
3 Besides, additional analyses showed that multilevel ordered logit models on the orig-
inal variable violated the proportional odds assumption (Long and Freese 2006), and
consequently, using this technique would potentially lead to estimation bias. Further-
more, multilevel multinomial logit models that simultaneously estimate separate binary
logits for all outcome categories compared to a reference category would lead to too
many comparisons to see clear patterns. Besides, additional analyses using such models
showed that especially the contrasts at the lower end were far less distinct.
4 We are grateful to Norris and Inglehart for providing us their data set.
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study is concerned with religious regulation, and we therefore rely in an
additional analysis on work by Grim and Finke (2006), who constructed
a separate measure of government regulation of religion.
Tertiary school enrollment.—To measure the educational expansion in
a country, we use figures on tertiary school enrollment (e.g., university)
per country in 1999, obtained from the World Bank (2001).
Education.—This is measured by the age at which people left school.
The EVS/WVS data provide a variable that indicates at what age people
finished school. This variable ranges from younger than 14 years of age
to 21 years of age or older.
Gini.—Following Norris and Inglehart (2004), we operationalize in-
come inequality in a country by the Gini index, which theoretically ranges
from zero (no inequality) to 100 (perfect inequality). We use 1995 figures
(or adjacent years when figures were missing for 1995) obtained from
various editions of the Human Development Report (United Nations De-
velopment Program 2001–4).
War casualties.—To measure the impact of war experienced in child-
hood, we use war casualties per 1,000 people in a country when people
were between 5 and 18 years old. We prefer a measure of the severity of
war instead of a measure of only the presence of war. The information
on numbers of casualties is obtained from Clodfelter (2002), and we use
population statistics from Lahmeyer (2006). We include figures for major
conflicts in which at least two countries were involved. The variable is
logged to deal with right-hand skewness.
Income.—Following Norris and Inglehart (2004), we examine the role
of personal insecurities by looking at people’s income. Because income
measures were incomparable between countries, we calculated Z-scores
per country. In this way it becomes impossible to explain country differ-
ences in religious attendance based on compositional differences in in-
come. However, it remains possible to test the hypothesis about the pre-
sumed negative effect of income on religious attendance, and we include
another measure of personal insecurities that differs across countries (i.e.,
employment status).
Unemployed.—We look at a second individual characteristic that, ac-
cording to Norris and Inglehart (2004), is indicative of personal insecur-
ities: employment status. It is assumed that people who are unemployed
are more at risk financially and economically than people who are em-
ployed. We include a dummy variable in our analysis, contrasting those
who are unemployed with all others.
National urbanization level.—This measures the share of the total pop-
ulation in a country living in urban areas in 1999, in percentages. Figures
are obtained from the World Bank (2001).5
5 For Bosnia and Herzegovina these figures were unavailable. We used the figures for
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Local urbanization level.—To measure urbanization level in the direct
environment of the respondent, we use the (natural logarithm of the)
number of inhabitants in the community or town of residence of the
respondent (truncated at 1,000 and 1 million inhabitants), obtained from
information provided in the EVS/WVS data set.
Religious parents.—This measures whether people were raised reli-
giously. We use the question asked in EVS/WVS (“were you raised reli-
giously?”), to which respondents could answer either yes or no. When this
variable is missing and retrospective information on church attendance
is available (this was the case for all respondents from the EVS part in
wave 4), we use the retrospective data on attendance. We categorize some-
one who attended religious meetings once a year or less (around the age
of 12) as not being raised religiously. All others are categorized as being
raised religiously. This coding results in a distribution almost identical to
the other variable on religious upbringing.
Religiosity cohort.—In order to measure the religious context of re-
spondents when they grew up, we aggregate individual-level data from
EVS/WVS. We again use the previous question (“were you raised reli-
giously?”), to which respondents could answer either yes or no. When this
variable is missing, we use the retrospective information about church
attendance around the age of 12, which we categorize in the way described
above. We then used the information in EVS/WVS to calculate trends in
the proportion of the population that was raised religiously. For example,
when 60-year-olds were asked in 1999 whether they were raised religiously
when they were 12 years old, their answer refers to their situation in 1951
( ). On the basis of all 60-year-olds, we calculate figures for1999 60 12
1951. Similarly, 61-year-olds provide information on 1950, and so on.
Because this approach often results in too few cases to estimate reliable
averages per year, we use an 11-year (the exact year plus and minus five
years) weighted moving average to smooth out irregularities. The measure
we obtain correlates highly (Pearson’s R p .95) with a similar measure
constructed by Iannaccone (n.d.).
Appendix table A1 provides an overview of the 60 countries included
in our study and their scores on the macrolevel variables. We found no
evidence for multicollinearity among the country and cohort variables.
Bivariate Pearson correlations are below .50, the Variance Inflation Fac-
Serbia and Montenegro. For some other countries the figures were unavailable for
1999. We used linear interpolation between the years for which we had valid scores
to estimate the figure for 1999.
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tors (VIF) are below 1.5, and the Condition Indices show no signs of
collinearity either.6
We extensively checked for influential cases, following a method anal-
ogous to the one proposed by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) and Snijders
and Bosker (1999, p. 134).7 More specifically, we calculated the stan-
dardized change in the estimates for each of our contextual-level variables
(i.e., the standardized dfbetas: DFBETAS) when we removed one country
at a time from the 60 countries in our data (the effects of individual-level
variables are robust). We identified 12 countries that had a significant
impact on our estimates ( ); many of these have aFFDFBETASFF 1 2/ N2
non-Christian dominant religion.8 It should be emphasized that of the
remaining 48 countries, virtually all countries have a Christian tradition
(exceptions are Bangladesh and Japan). We present the results of the
analyses based on the full sample, as well as the subsample in which we
removed all 12 influential countries at once. We include two control var-
iables:
Marital status.—We distinguish people who are single, divorced, wid-
owed, and married/cohabiting (reference category).
Female.—We control for sex, using male as the reference category. De-
scriptive statistics for the independent variables are presented in table 1.
For various reasons, we do not include several other macrolevel var-
iables that have been examined before. Because of the small number of
cases in comparative macro research, we have tried to capture the crucial
concepts of each theoretical line of thought.9 Hence, an important reason
6 More specifically, the highest condition index is 21 (large are those condition indices
in the range of 30 or larger), and there are not two or more variables that have large
proportions of variance (.50 or more) that correspond to the largest condition indices
in our data.
7 We used an R macro developed by Nieuwenhuis, Pelzer, and te Grotenhuis (2009)
to perform these robustness checks.
8 The countries are Azerbaijan, Brazil, China, Ghana, Greece, India, Ireland, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Moldova, Nigeria, and Turkey. Five of these 12 countries have a non-
Christian tradition.
9 Per capita GDP is excluded because it is captured by theoretically more meaningful
variables. We do not use the Human Development Index, which was examined by
Norris and Inglehart (2004), because it is a summary score of education, illiteracy, per
capita GDP, and health. The measure does not separate the influence of ideological
modernization (i.e., education, illiteracy) vis-a`-vis economic modernization (i.e., health).
We also exclude a dummy variable indicating whether a country is, or has been, a
Communist country (Kelley and De Graaf 1997; North and Gwin 2004; McCleary and
Barro 2006) because the characteristic features of Communist countries are already
incorporated by three measures adopted in our study. In Communist countries, there
is little income inequality, people are socialized in a rather secular context, and they
score high on religious regulation. Hence, including a dummy variable for Communism
would reduce the influence of variables that have a more meaningful understanding.
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TABLE 1





Religious regulationa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0–10 4.17 2.09 0
Ginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.70–59.10 35.42 9.27 0
Tertiary school enrollmenta . . . . . 2.61–82.42 38.79 18.29 0
Urbanization (%)a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.00–97.00 68.61 17.15 0
Cohort:
Religiositya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0–1 .66 .26 0
War casualties (ln) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0–3.82 .26 .84 0
Individual:
Educational levela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.00–21.00 17.80 2.66 4.04
Income (Z-score)a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.46–13.31 0 1.00 12.6
Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0/1 .19 2.82
Religious parentsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0/1 .65 3.13
Local urbanization (ln)a . . . . . . . . . 6.91–13.82 10.09 2.18 0
Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0/1 .52 .07
Marital status: .36
Married/cohabiting . . . . . . . . . . . . 0/1 .63
Single . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0/1 .23
Divorced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0/1 .06
Widowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0/1 .08
a Variables mean-centered in the analysis.
for not including certain macrolevel variables is that they are already
captured by associated variables in our study. Although our study covers
more nations than ever studied before in the literature on religious at-
tendance, it is still important to be parsimonious and to avoid problems
of multicollinearity.
Methods
We make use of multilevel methods, which take into account the hier-
archical nature of our data (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Raudenbush and
Bryk 2002). Ignoring the hierarchical structure and the dependence across
observations from the same country would lead to an underestimation of
the standard errors, possibly leading to wrong conclusions about non-
existent relations. Given our dichotomous dependent variable, we estimate
multilevel logistic models in which we have 136,611 observations at the
In preliminary analyses, we included dummy variables for religious tradition (i.e.,
Catholic-Orthodox, Protestant, other), but because these variables were insignificant,
we removed them from our models.
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individual level and 60 at the country level.10 For the estimation of these
multilevel models we use hierarchical linear and nonlinear modeling
(HLM 6).
RESULTS
Using multilevel logistic regression techniques, we find that in the empty
model (i.e., without predictors except the intercept), the residual variance
at the country level is 1.87. This means that the correlation in religious
attendance between two randomly chosen individuals in the same, ran-
domly drawn, country is .36.11 Put differently, 36% of the variation in
religious attendance is due to the country in which people live, which
seems substantial when compared to the importance of social context in
other research areas.12
The cross-national variation in religious attendance is due to differences
in composition and context. About 23% ( ) of the cross-[1.87 1.44]/1.87
national variation in religious attendance can be explained by the unequal
distribution of individual characteristics across nations. When we add the
contextual variables (including the cohort variables), the model explains
75% ( ) of the cross-national variance in religious atten-[1.87 0.46]/1.87
dance. The model excluding 12 influential countries explains 84% of the
cross-national variance. This means that the full theoretical model ex-
plains a substantial part of worldwide patterns of religious attendance.
If we look at both the individual and contextual levels, the model explains
36% of the variance.13 Given the fact that the values in the method2R
used here are usually considerably lower than the ordinary least squares
10 For the period-specific country measures, we used the weighted average of the period-
specific scores per country.
11 This so-called intraclass correlation r is computed according to the following formula:
2t0
rp ,
2 2t  p /30
where is the variance at the country level (Snijders and Bosker 1999, p. 224). Note2t0
that the logistic distribution for the level 1 residual implies a variance of .2p /3 ≈ 3.29
12 For instance, Snijders and Bosker (1999, p. 46) report that values between 5% and
20% are common in educational research, where pupils (level 1) are studied within
classes (level 2).
13 The proportion of explained variance in the multilevel logistic model was computed
with the following formula (Snijders and Bosker 1999, pp. 225–26):
2jF2R p .dicho 2 2 2j  t  p /3F 0
Here, is the variance of the linear predictor of Y, and is the intercept variance.2 2j tF 0
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values predicting continuous outcomes (Snijders and Bosker 1999), we2R
believe that our model provides a strong explanation for religious atten-
dance.
Which factors in the model explain cross-national variation in religious
attendance? We discuss the empirical evidence for the hypotheses one by
one below. The main discussion is based on the total model (i.e., including
60 countries) and the model-based standard errors. To assess the sensitivity
of our findings, we also look at “robust standard errors” (Raudenbush and
Bryk 2002, p. 276) and at the results of the model excluding influential
countries. To examine the size of the effects, we report (for the continuous
variables) “standardized effects”: the associated change in the odds of
attending religious meetings once a week or more with a one-standard-
deviation change in the independent variable.
Religious Regulation
In line with the first hypothesis, we find that religious attendance is neg-
atively related to religious regulation in a country. The conclusion is based
on the Norris and Inglehart 20-item scale of religious regulation, and the
results hold for the entire sample as well as for the subset of countries
excluding influential cases. More specifically, the results (for the entire
sample) show that a one-standard-deviation increase in religious regu-
lation (i.e., 2.09; see table 1) is associated with a 17% ( ) decline.091#2.091 e
in the odds of attending religious participation (at least) once a week. In
additional analyses, we also find that the religious regulation measure of
Grim and Finke (2006) is negatively and statistically significantly asso-
ciated with attendance ( ; SE p .046).14 With this measure, webp .108
find that a one-standard-deviation increase leads to a decline of 24% in
weekly attendance.15 In summary, we find evidence that worldwide pat-
terns of religious attendance are related to religious regulation.
Modernization of Ideologies
According to the theory on the modernization of ideologies, cross-national
variation in religious attendance is partly explained by education. We find
some evidence for this theory in our analysis. Table 2 shows that the
higher people are educated, the less likely they are to attend religious
meetings once a week or more. This confirms hypothesis 2. However, it
14 Results of additional analyses are available on request from the authors.
15 The Grim and Finke (2006) measure of “government favoritism of religion” has no
significant effect on attendance.
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TABLE 2
Multilevel Logistic Regression of Attending Religious Meetings Once a


















Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.773 (.089)** (.102)** 2.011 (.067)** (.072**
Country:
Religious regulation . . . . . .091 (.045)* (.047)* .072 (.037)* (.041)*
Tertiary school enroll-
ment (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .013 (.006)* (.006)* .005 (.005) (.005)
Gini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .032 (.010)** (.009)** .036 (.008)** (.008)**
Urbanization (%) . . . . . . . . .012 (.006)* (.007)* .020 (.006)** (.006)**
Cohort:
Religiosity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.324 (.024)** (.090)** 2.552 (.120)** (.473)**
War casualties (ln) . . . . . . . .060 (.011)** (.027)* .057 (.011)** (.029)*
Individual:
Educational level . . . . . . . . .011 (.003)** (.006)* .014 (.004)** (.007)*
Income (Z-score) . . . . . . . . . .042 (.009)** (.013)* .037 (.011)** (.015)*
Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .052 (.019)** (.045) .117 (.022)** (.033)**
Religious parents . . . . . . . . 1.324 (.024)** (.090)** 1.408 (.028)** (.103)**
Urbanization (ln) . . . . . . . . . .054 (.004)** (.012)** .061 (.004)** (.011)**
Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .418 (.016)** (.052)** .491 (.018)** (.044)**
Marital status:a
Single . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 (.019)** (.039)* .078 (.022)** (.049)
Divorced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .422 (.036)** (.062)** .417 (.040)** (.072)**
Widowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .232 (.027)** (.063)** .239 (.029)** (.072)**
Interactions:
Religiosity cohort #
religious parents . . . . . . . . . .588 (.109)** (.359) .415 (.122)** (.415)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2R 36.4 36.3
Variance country . . . . . . . . . . . .46 .20
N1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136,611 116,318
N2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 48
a The reference category is married/cohabiting.
* (one-tailed tests).P ! .05
** .P ! .01
should be emphasized that the size of the effect of education is rather
small (i.e., the standardized effect is 3%).
The evidence for a contextual effect of education is unclear. Based on
the analysis of 60 countries, the multilevel analysis shows that the more
people are enrolled in tertiary education in a country, the less often people
attend religious meetings in that country. This suggests that over and
above people’s own education, the educational level of the country plays
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a role in people’s religious attendance. However, when we exclude the 12
countries that most strongly affect our estimates, there is no significant
effect of the educational level of the country. All in all, we tentatively
conclude that there is some, though inconsistent, evidence for the theory
on the modernization of ideologies.
Modernization of Economies
The theory on the modernization of economies explains worldwide pat-
terns of religious attendance with the notion of insecurity—whatever its
source. In line with this theory, we find that financial insecurities at the
individual level lead to more religious attendance (hypothesis 4). The
higher the income of people, the less likely they are to attend religious
meetings. In standardized terms, we find that income is associated with
a 4% lower odds of attendance. We also find that people who are un-
employed have a 5% higher odds of weekly participation, compared to
employed people.
It was further hypothesized that in countries with more socioeconomic
inequalities, people attend religious meetings more often (hypothesis 5).
Our results are clearly in line with expectations. Using the Gini measure
of income inequality, we find that people who live in countries with larger
income disparities are more likely to attend religious meetings frequently.
The magnitude of the effect is large. A one-standard-deviation increase
in the Gini score is associated with a 35% increase in the odds of weekly
religious attendance. In additional analyses, we found, as expected, that
the effect of income inequality holds for both the poor and the rich (i.e.,
the cross-level interactions between Gini and income and unemployment
are insignificant). To see whether our conclusions depend on our measure,
we performed an additional analysis in which we substituted the Gini
index for social welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP, which can
be thought of as measuring the degree to which the state reduces people’s
insecurities.16 The bivariate correlation between these contextual measures
is .57, and we find a highly significant negative effect of welfare ex-
penditure on religious attendance as well ( ; SE p .014; stan-bp .033
dardized effect p 26%).17
To examine the role of insecurities further, we study possible enduring
effects of existential insecurities during childhood. It was hypothesized
that people who experienced a war during their childhood attend religious
meetings more often later in their life (hypothesis 6). We find that wartime
16 Information was obtained from International Labour Organization (2007).
17 We use Gini in our main models because we lack information on social welfare
expenditure for several countries.
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casualty rates during childhood indeed have a significant positive effect
on religious attendance. The magnitude of the effect is small, however
(standardized effect p 1%).18
Modernization of Social Ties
The theory on the role of social ties argues that cross-national variation
in religious attendance is an outcome of religious socialization and control.
On the basis of this theory, we expect to see lower religious attendance
among people who live in more urban regions (hypothesis 7), and this is
what we see in our analysis. Interestingly, we also find that, over and
above the level of urbanization of people’s region of living, the urbani-
zation level of the entire country plays an independent role. People who
live in more urban countries are less likely to attend religious meetings
on a frequent basis. This confirms hypothesis 8. The standardized effects
are 11% (local urbanization level) and 19% (national urbanization level).
The theory also predicts that parental religious socialization affects
religious attendance (hypothesis 9). We find strong support for this hy-
pothesis. The effect is highly significant and substantial in magnitude.
People who were raised religiously have a 3.8 ( ) times higher odds of1.32e
attending religious meetings once a week or more.
Growing up in a religious nation matters as well. It appears that, net
of being raised by religious parents, people who were born and socialized
in a more religious country attend religious meetings more often later in
life than those who grew up in a more secular nation. The cohort effect
is highly significant and strong in terms of effect size. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the proportion of people who were raised religiously
during their childhood increases the odds of weekly attendance by 41%.
It suggests that over and above the importance of the religious sociali-
zation of the parents, the religious context of the nation during people’s
childhood has an enduring role in their religious practice. This confirms
hypothesis 10. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that there would be a
negative interaction between parental religiosity and the effect of national
religiosity (hypothesis 11). But when we look at robust standard errors,
and especially at the subsample of countries, we do not find a significant
effect.
18 Additional analysis shows that the war effect holds for both men and women, thereby
suggesting that wars affect the insecurity of the entire population.
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Fig. 2.—Expected and observed probabilities of religious attendance in 60 countries
Model Fit
The theories tested in our study explain a substantial part of variation
in religious attendance (table 2), including country differences. Never-
theless, one could wonder whether some nations do not match theoretical
expectations. Particular attention has been paid in the literature to the
“exceptional situation” of the United States, which is a highly modern
though relatively religious society (e.g., Kelley and De Graaf 1997). Does
the religious attendance rate in the United States fit the expectations of
the theoretical model?
To answer this question, we have to look at figure 2 (based on 60
countries) and figure 3 (48 countries). They present the expected and
observed probabilities of religious attendance per country, using the results
of the multilevel logistic model presented in table 2. The observed pattern
for the United States matches expectations quite well. For the full sample,
we see that the observed probability of attending religious meetings
weekly (i.e., .44) somewhat exceeds the expected probability (i.e., .30) for
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Fig. 3.—Expected and observed probabilities of religious attendance in 48 countries
the United States. This, however, does not provide a strong case for U.S.
exceptionalism in worldwide patterns of religious attendance, although
the religious attendance is higher than expected. We do find several other
countries that are much more exceptional, such as Malta (MA) and Nigeria
(NG).
Why is the United States not exceptional according to our model? One
common explanation provided in the literature focuses on religious reg-
ulation. However, when we remove religious regulation from our full
model, we see that the expected probability for attending religious meet-
ings in the United States (i.e., .36) comes closer to the observed probability
(i.e., .44) as compared to the model including religious regulation (see fig.
4). The theories on existential securities and religious socialization and
control, subsumed under the secularization paradigm, seem to provide a
better argument. For instance, when we remove Gini from the full model,
we see that the expected probability for attending religious meetings in
the United States lowers from .30 to .23. This is in strong contrast with
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Fig. 4.—Expected and observed probabilities of religious attendance in 60 countries, after
excluding selected predictors.
the observed probability (i.e., .44), suggesting that, when we do not take
into account the importance of socioeconomic inequalities in a country,
the United States is indeed exceptional. The present population of the
United States can also be regarded as exceptionally religious when we
overlook the importance of the “religious past” (i.e., religiosity of parents
and religious context during childhood) and urbanization. When we re-
move these factors from the model, we see a predicted probability for the
United States of .25 and .26, respectively. In sum, these findings suggest
that because of the religious past, urbanization, and current socioeconomic
conditions, the United States remains highly religious.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we showed that almost 40% of the variation in religious
attendance is due to the country in which people live. To explain this
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cross-national variation, we used four influential theories discussed in the
literature. These theories point at different mechanisms, that is, on the
role of religious regulation, educational expansion, existential insecurities,
and religious socialization and control. We derived a number of hypotheses
from these theories within a multilevel framework in which cross-national
differences in religion are the result of individual (or “compositional”)
effects, contextual effects, and interactions between individual and con-
textual effects. To test hypotheses rigorously, we examined the theories
simultaneously (instead of one by one), analyzed individual religious at-
tendance (instead of country-level religious attendance), used data on 60
nations (instead of a few), and employed hierarchical regression tech-
niques. The theories used in our research explain 75% of the country
differences in religious attendance.
Country differences are partly explained by the religious regulation
theory. The degree of religious regulation negatively affects religious at-
tendance, which is in line with the idea that stronger state control of
religious markets would lead to religious firms producing unattractive
religious products. We find little and inconsistent evidence for one of the
theories subsumed under the secularization paradigm: the theory on the
modernization of ideologies. Although we find, as expected, that higher
educated people attend religious meetings less frequently, the impact is
small. Moreover, it is unclear whether, over and above people’s own
education, the educational level in the country negatively affects religious
attendance. More research is needed to test the idea that educational
participation and the rise of a scientific worldview are difficult to wed
with the more traditional religious worldview. Furthermore, more re-
search is needed to examine whether education is indeed associated with
a more scientific worldview, as the theory assumes.
There are two other secularization theories that are empirically sup-
ported in our study and that play a substantial role in understanding
cross-national variation in religious attendance. Our results are in line
with the theory on the modernization of economies. The main mechanism
of this theory identifies a positive link between personal or societal in-
securities and religious attendance (Gill and Lundsgaarde 2004; Norris
and Inglehart 2004). In line with this theory we find that attendance rates
are particularly high in countries with more socioeconomic inequalities
and fewer social welfare expenditure. This effect equally applies to both
poor and rich people, which is in line with the idea that because of
economic mobility and the possibility of unemployment in the (nearby)
future also, the more affluent population feels more insecure in countries
with more inequalities and without a well-developed social welfare sys-
tem. We also see that people with a lower income and who are unemployed
attend religious meetings more often, and we find an enduring effect of
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growing up in times of war. In summary, the results of our study suggest
that personal and societal insecurities play a crucial role in explaining
cross-national variation in religious attendance.
Our study also finds strong evidence for the theory on the modernization
of social ties, which connects religious attendance with religious sociali-
zation and social control. It assumes that religious behavior is a social
phenomenon, in which people are socialized, controlled, and possibly sanc-
tioned by their environment. In line with this theory, we find that cross-
national differences are partly caused by differences in levels of urbani-
zation. People who live in urban regions attend religious meetings less
frequently than those who live in more rural areas. Over and above local
urbanization, the urbanization of the nation in which people live also
negatively affects religious attendance. This is in line with the more gen-
eral idea that in urban settings, people are highly mobile in terms of
geographical movements and occupational changes, making it more dif-
ficult to socialize and control people.
The theory on the modernization of social ties is further confirmed when
looking at parental and national religious socialization. People who were
raised religiously by their parents attend religious meetings more fre-
quently. We also find that people who were raised in religious societies
have higher attendance rates than people who grew up in more secular
nations, and this cohort effect goes over and above the positive effect of
being raised by religious parents. This suggests that in religious nations,
not only are there more people who were raised by religious parents, but
the religious norms people internalize are strongly reinforced and con-
trolled by others, such as family members, neighbors, peers, and colleagues
at work.
We see the analysis presented here as just a beginning of more theo-
retical and empirical work to understand cross-national patterns of relig-
iosity. For example, further research is encouraged to study other dimen-
sions of religion cross-nationally (e.g., religious beliefs), to have a closer
look at the non-Christian nations that are underrepresented in our data,
and to elaborate on the hypotheses and mechanisms tested in our study
(e.g., Why does insecurity apparently affect religious attendance?).
DISCUSSION
We believe that one issue deserves special theoretical and empirical at-
tention in future research: the dynamics of religious decline and increase
within countries. Several insights of this study can be used as a starting
point.
First, the implications of the intergenerational transmission and rein-
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forcement of religious behavior are far from trivial. They indicate that
societies follow divergent pathways, depending on different starting con-
ditions. Religious countries remain rather religious or become even more
religious because many people in these countries are raised by religious
parents, they make religious friends, they interact with religious neighbors,
and they marry a religious partner. Although urbanization generally weak-
ens social control, the fact that many people in such countries share the
same religious norms will provide a strong barrier to religious decline.
By contrast, more secular countries accelerate toward religious decline:
secularization is self-reinforcing . In those countries, people who are raised
religiously are less strongly sanctioned when they leave the religious com-
munity, leading them to adjust to their more secular environment. For
the next generation, the initial conditions have changed: fewer people in
these countries are religious than before, implying that even fewer people
are raised religiously and that those who are, are confronted with an even
more secular environment. Our study suggests that path dependency plays
a major role: given initial macrolevel conditions, the process of religious
change is self-reinforcing. We encourage further research to examine these
feedback processes in a dynamic fashion (Schelling 1978), as has been
done in research in historical sociology (e.g., Goldstone 1998; Mahoney
2000) and social inequality (DiPrete and Eirich 2006).
Second, our study provides insights into why there are differences in
initial conditions in religious attendance. Why are some countries religious
to begin with? Naturally, historical reasons and contingent events that
are exogenous to our theoretical model play a major role. Examples of
exogenous factors are selectivity of immigration (e.g., the inflow of reli-
gious immigrants) and differences in fertility levels and mortality. But
next to these factors, this study emphasizes the importance of religious
regulation, urbanization, and existential insecurities in the past. Countries
in which religions were not strongly regulated in the past, that had a
large rural population, or in which the inhabitants were confronted with
personal and societal threats were more likely to have a religious popu-
lation. Indeed, in an additional analysis (not presented here), we found
that the religiosity of the cohort (used as an independent variable in our
study) is positively and significantly affected by the number of years of
division between church and state in a country (a measure of religious
regulation in the past). Thus, rather than contrasting the secularization
paradigm and the religious market paradigm, future research could fruit-
fully integrate elements from both paradigms.
Third, and along the same lines, our study provides explanations of
why trends in religious decline or increase sometimes stop or even turn
in the opposite direction. Our study shows that present conditions with
respect to religious regulation, urbanization, and socioeconomic inequality
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affect religious attendance, even when taking into account the religious
past. This suggests that trends in religious attendance can change when
governments change their regulation of religions, when there is a change
in urbanization, or when populations are confronted with a change in
their personal or societal threat—whatever its source.
Given these implications of our study, it is important to emphasize that
two of the “secularization” or “modernization” theories tested here over-
come a well-known criticism of the secularization paradigm, the idea that
secularization is an inevitable trend in all countries. As Stark and Finke
(2000, p. 78) formulate it, “What is needed is a body of theory to explain
religious variation, to tell us when and why various aspects of religiousness
rise and fall, or are stable. In that regard, the secularization theory is as
useless as a hotel elevator that only goes down.” There is not a single
secularization theory. And the theories maintain, for different reasons,
that the modernization-secularization link is a general tendency, not an
iron law (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Economically developed nations are
generally less religious because economic development is generally asso-
ciated with urbanization and fewer insecurities (e.g., diminishing income
inequalities), and the religious decline that is the result of these tendencies
subsequently affects future generations. Taken together, the theoretical
model tested in this study—including the secularization theories—pro-
vides insights into differences in initial conditions, path dependency, and
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